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1. Introduction
First-order normative theories concern what things are right and wrong, good and bad,
just and unjust, rational and irrational, and so on, and why they are so. Metanormative
theories concern the nature of first-order normative questions and claims. What is it to
think that something is wrong? Are such judgments apt to be true or false? Is their truth a
matter of objective fact? What would such facts be like? (And so on.) The two sorts of
theories  are  widely  treated  as  independent.  For  instance,  suppose  you  advocate
consequentialism in normative ethics. Then you think that any action is morally right just
in case, and because, it maximises the good. It seems you can think this irrespective of
whether your metanormative view of normative judgments is that they’re some sort of
conative states that cannot be true or false in any non-minimalist sense (expressivism), or
that they’re the sorts of things that can be robustly true or false and some of them are true
(non-error-theoretic cognitivism), or even that they’re truth-apt but systematically false
(error theory). Similarly, you can endorse consequentialism irrespective of whether you
think moral rightness is an objective property (whether natural or non-natural) or whether
you think that knowledge of the truth of consequentialism is  a priori or  a posteriori.
Accepting  a  particular  first-order  normative  theory  doesn’t  seem  to  force  your
metanormative hand.1 Nor does your metanormative theory seem to force your normative
hand.  Most  expressivists  and  error-theorists  take  their  metanormative  theories  to  be
independent  of whatever coherent  answers to first-order normative questions we may
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adopt.2 Naturalist  moral  realism may pair  most  easily  with consequentialism,  but  the
pairing is by no means obligatory. Among non-naturalist  moral realists,  we find both
both consequentialists and various kinds of non-consequentialists.3 
First-order  normative  theory  and  metanormative  theory  are,  then,  widely  seen  as
independent enterprises.4 This paper argues that several debates in metanormative theory
involve claims that have potentially surprising first-order normative implications. I first
outline a general recipe for generating this result. I then apply this recipe to three debates
in  metaethics:  the  modal  status  of  basic  moral  principles,  normative  vagueness  and
indeterminacy,  and  the  determination  of  reference  for  normative  terms.  I  argue  that
certain views on each issue carry first-order normative commitments in accordance with
my recipe. In between, I address an important objection to two of these three applications
of my general recipe. 
2. A General Recipe
It’s no news that some metanormative claims have normative implications. For instance,
the kind of analytic naturalism according to which ‘right’ means ‘maximises happiness’
implies the truth of utilitarianism.5 In these familiar cases the normative implications are
direct and fairly obvious. Direct normative implications often lessen the credibility of
those metanormative claims. For instance, even many utilitarians deny there are sound
arguments for substantive normative conclusions like the truth of utilitarianism solely
from premises about what normative terms mean (Moore 1903).  I’ll  argue that some
metanormative  claims  whose  normative  implications  may  not  be  immediately
recognizable nonetheless have such implications, but needn’t be less credible simply on
that score.6 
2 Such expressivists include Ayer (1936/1971, p. 105), Stevenson (1944, p. 110), Blackburn (1988, p. 
367), and Gibbard (2008, p. 33). For error theory, see Mackie (1977, p. 16).
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The metanormative claims on which I’ll focus have normative implications because they
make normative differences. The argument takes the following general form: 
(M1) Factors  picked  out  by  some  metanormative  claims  make  a  normative
difference.
(M2) A factor F makes a normative difference only if F is normatively relevant. 
(C1) So,  factors  picked  out  by  some  metanormative  claims  are  normatively
relevant.
(M3) The claim that F is normatively relevant is a normative claim.
(C2) So, some metanormative claims commit themselves to normative claims, to the
effect that some factor is normatively relevant.
You can think of this as a general recipe for generating violations of the independence of
metanormative theory from first-order normative theory. I don’t take the recipe to generalise
beyond the normative, for reasons that’ll emerge in discussion. Examples of metanormative
claims I take to satisfy (M1) will be contentious short of argument.  (They won’t carry
normative implications in the direct way that analytic naturalism does.) So I must indulge
your patience until I get to my applications of (M1). But to understand the recipe, we need
to know what normative claims are and what it is to make a normative difference and be
normatively relevant. 
I know of no uncontentious analysis of what it is for a claim to be normative. But a leaf
from Jonathan Dancy’s account of normative facts gets us in the right ballpark.  Dancy
suggests that normative facts are explicit answers to the question what to do (or believe or
feel or want). Some normative facts specify what to do fairly determinately, such as the fact
that I ought to φ rather than ψ. Others answer that question in a less determinate way. The
widely been met with suspicion. Dworkin (1996) and Kramer (2009) argue that metanormative 
theories are also first-order theories, or else are to be settled on the basis of such. Berker (forthcoming) 
argues that to do first-order moral theory is also to do metaethics, but on the basis of controversial 
assumptions about the relation between grounding and normative ethics. Some writers seek to exclude 
some metanormative options on first-order grounds, but perhaps not always charitably; see e.g. Dancy 
(2004, ch. 4), Enoch (2011, ch. 2), and Parfit (2011, vol. 1, pp. 73-82 and vol. 2, pp. 277-88 and 457-
9). More convincing, to my mind, are the views that any choice of a deontic logic rules out some 
logically tenable moral theories (Sayre-McCord 1986) and that statements of identity or reduction 
between normative properties and natural or supernatural properties are normative claims even if 
they’re also metaphysical claims (Heathwood 2012). 
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fact  that  chocolate  is  good is  clearly practically  relevant,  but doesn’t  specify just  what
difference it makes to what to do. In addition to simple normative facts like these, there are
more complex normative facts that contain an atomic normative fact plus a reason why it
holds. These can be expressed by claims like That P makes it the case that you ought to act
in way W, S ought to φ in virtue of the fact that P, and so on. Such facts constitute explicit
answers to both the question of what to do and the question why. It’s crucial to distinguish
normative facts from facts that are normatively relevant or significant – from facts that
make a difference to what to do. That an action would please many and pain none is a non-
normative fact. This fact, call it H, could be part of an answer to whether this action is the
thing to do. But H isn’t the same fact as the fact that H is relevant to what to do. The latter
fact is a meta-fact about H. That meta-fact is normative. It’s some such fact as that H is a
reason to do the action, or that H makes it the case that one ought to do it, or that H is a
reason why doing it would be good. (Dancy 2006: 136-8.) 
I propose to understand normative claims on the same model,  as claims that constitute
answers (of varying determinacy in their content) to the question what to do (or believe,
feel, or want). (At this level of precision, claims may be either propositions or (interpreted)
sentences.) The claim that P is a reason to do an act is a normative claim because it’s an
answer to the question what to do. (It’s a partial answer. Other partial answers are given by
other reasons for and against the action.) P alone is only part of such an answer, and thus not
itself a normative fact. When I defend (M3) below, I’ll in effect propose that the claim that
something is normatively relevant is a normative claim because it’s a claim, about some
other fact, that that fact makes a normative difference to what to do (or believe, feel, or
want),  and  in  that  way  constitutes  a  partial  answer  to  the  question  what  to  do.  This
characterisation of normative claims runs in the material mode. It takes the contents of
answers to the question what to do to be facts about what’s right, what’s good, what one
ought  or  has  reason  to  do,  and  so  on.  Ordinary  normative  thought  and  talk  allows
freedom of movement between claims about what’s right and claims about what falls into
the extension of ‘right’  (word or concept).  But it’s  controversial  whether  these latter
claims in the formal mode also count as normative claims. They have some claim to do
so. That x falls into the extension of ‘right’ answers the question what to do. However,
one might think that its license to answer that question derives from the feature of the
truth predicate that x is right is true if and only if x is right, and x’s falling under ‘right’
isn’t normatively relevant as such. These questions will arise in sections 4-6 below. 
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(M2) states  a  sufficient  condition  for  normative  relevance.  That  x is  F  is  normatively
relevant  if  x’s  being F makes a difference (in some non-causal  way) to the normative
features of x. So here I use “normative relevance” as an umbrella term for ways of making a
normative difference,  whatever that might include.  The intuitive  thought  is  just  that  if
things  differ  only  in  normatively  irrelevant  ways,  differential  responses  to  them  are
unjustified,  whereas  if  there  are  normative  differences  between things,  then differential
responses are justified. Consider a special case. To make an action wrong is to make a
normative difference. If being F makes actions wrong, then (so far as that goes) something
that’s F wouldn’t have been wrong had it not been F.7 So being wrong making is a way of
being normatively relevant; it’s relevant to how normative features are distributed across
things. But it’s not the only way. That an action is F might be normatively relevant not by
making it have a normative feature N but by enabling some other feature G to make it have
N or by intensifying the contribution that F makes to N (Dancy 2004). Thus what makes a
difference to whether x is wrong needn’t be what explains why it is a fact that x is wrong.
(That F enables G to make x wrong doesn’t explain why x is wrong; what it helps to explain
is the distinct normative fact that G makes x wrong.) 
In what follows I’ll apply (M1) to metanormative claims that make normative differences in
none  of  these  three  ways,  but  in  ways  that  aren’t  as  immediately  recognizable  as
normatively relevant. In fact, two of my three applications of my recipe will require that
differences in the reference of normative terms and concepts are normative differences that
fall under my recipe. This claim is controversial. But since the controversy doesn’t affect
my basic recipe as such but only its scope, I’ll leave it until section 5. Here I’ll instead say
something a bit more general about how normative difference-making might be understood.
It might be characterised in terms of counterfactuals, such as If F hadn’t obtained, then
normative condition N wouldn’t have obtained and  If F hadn’t obtained, N would still
have  occurred.  Such  counterfactuals  might  not  suffice  for  an  adequate  analysis of
normative relevance.8 But their  (non-vacuous) truth might  still  be a (fallible)  test for
7 Counterfactuals like these help to explain why we want to restrict ‘F’ to qualitative features. If Robbie 
the Rapacious Robber didn’t exist, his wrongful robbing wouldn’t exist. But what matters normatively 
to the wrongness of his actions is that they involve robbing, not that they involve Robbie. If rapacious 
robbing had occurred, but not by Robbie, it would still have been wrong. 
8 Some tweaks will be forced by the distinction between derivative and non-derivative relevance. 
Suppose I’ve promised to give you an F (say, an apple). I give you x. Whether x is F makes a 
difference to whether I did as I ought: it makes a difference to whether I’ve fulfilled my promise. So 
the normative relevance of Fness derives from the fact that F figures in the content of my promise 
(where the fact that I promised to φ either is, or else derives its relevance from something that is, non-
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whether F is normatively relevant to N (in the given circumstances). Or at least that’s so
under some such refinements as requiring the difference-making to be robust under some
degree of abstraction or across a certain range of counterfactual variation. For instance,
certain reasons to help someone who is a friend obtain would still obtain even if there
wasn’t a friendship but some other special relationship, but not otherwise. A different
way  to  characterise  normative  difference-making  is  as  follows.9 Take  a  scenario  S
consisting of various facts. To determine whether a given fact F in the scenario makes a
difference to a normative fact N in the scenario, compare any actual scenario S in which
F is  present  with  the  scenario  S* that  results  if  we remove F from S.  If  there’s  no
variation between S and S* with respect to N, then F is naturally described as not making
a difference (with respect to N). If there’s variation, F does make a difference. This is so
whether the variation is that no normative condition at all holds in S* or that a normative
condition N* holds which is distinct from N but has the same valence as N (say, that a
state of affairs is less good or there’s more reason to perform an action). So understood,
difference-makers support the above counterfactuals and their status as at least a fallible
test.  Under  either  characterisation,  factors  that  make  a  difference  to  what  normative
conditions hold are naturally described as normatively relevant, since they’ll be relevant
to how normative features are distributed across things. (Neither characterisation takes
sides on whether normative claims come only in material or also formal modes.)  
So much for (M2). Now consider (M3). What (M3) claims to be normative is the claim,
about some fact, that that fact is normatively relevant. (Many normatively relevant facts
are  themselves  non-normative.)  Again,  being  wrong  making  is  a  way  of  being
normatively relevant. (M3) is plausible in this special case. The claim that some fact is
wrong making is  a  normative claim,  whatever  else  (such as a metaphysical  claim) it
might be. Such a claim states that a certain fact stands in a certain normative relation to
an act. I myself find it hard to believe that Kicking puppies is wrong is a normative claim
but Kicking puppies is wrong because of the pain it causes isn’t. What the second adds to
the first is just a reason why kicking puppies is wrong – a kind of reason that can be used
in a moral argument irrespective of one’s views on the metaphysics of ethics. How is that
not  a  normative  claim?  Similarly,  moral  principles  can  be  thought  of  as  identifying
derivatively normatively relevant). 
9 This characterisation adapts the general template for accounts of causal difference-making proposed by
Strevens (2008, p. 55) and the application of that template to define non-causally difference-making 
grounds in Krämer and Roski (2017). Its application will be sensitive to our background assumptions 
about what alterations in scenarios (including various counter-possible alterations) are coherent.  
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morally relevant factors (or, perhaps, factors that explain the moral features of things),
and statements of moral principles are normative claims. Acts are made wrong solely by
failing to maximise general happiness is exactly the sort of thing that a utilitarian moral
theory says and which non-utilitarian theories are bound to deny.  Nor does the special
case of claims about what’s right/wrong making look like an exception. Suppose that the
fact that my promise wasn’t given under coercion or fraud enables the fact that I promised
to φ to be a normative reason for me to φ. That some factor enables another fact to be a
reason to do something says, of that factor, that it’s normatively relevant. Being told that
some present fact is an enabler doesn’t tell us anything very determinate about what to do,
but it’s nonetheless a partial answer to the question what to do. (M3) generalises this. The
claim that  something makes a normative difference (in whatever way such differences
can be made) is a partial answer to the question what to do, and thus a normative claim. 
What  hangs  on  classifying  the  claim  that  something  is  normatively  relevant  as  a
normative rather than non-normative claim? Not much, one might say. It makes little
difference  in,  say,  biology  whether  the  fact  that  certain  (non-biological)  facts  make
certain biological facts obtain is itself a biological fact. And even if claims about what
makes  biological  facts  obtain  count  as  biological  claims,  one  might  think  they’re
different from other biological claims. But examples like this don’t convince me that it
makes  little  difference  whether  we accept  (M3).  Even if  the claim that  something is
normatively relevant is also a claim about (say) the metaphysics of normativity, it isn’t
only that.10 Claims of normative relevance concerning what factors make things right and
wrong  or  enable  other  factors  to  do  so  are  needed  to  distinguish  rival  first-order
normative theories. Theories may agree in their claims about what’s right and wrong, and
only differ in their claims about what makes them right and wrong. However things stand
in  biology,  one  would  expect  to  distinguish  normative  theories  by  their  normative
content, not by some non-normative claims they make. 
I also doubt that the biological (or the chemical, or the like) is the right analogy with the
10 Note that expressivists classify claims like Kicking puppies is wrong because of the pain it causes as 
normative claims. The moral sensibility of someone who thinks that kicking puppies is wrong because 
of the pain it causes is different from someone who thinks that kicking puppies is wrong because we 
don’t like it (Blackburn 1988). But this latter point seems robust across cognitivist theories of 
normative judgment as well. I would thus be surprised if the status of such claims as normative were 
just an optional choice point for theories of normative judgment. Their status as normative strikes me 
as part of the subject matter.
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normative in settling whether to accept (M3). The biological looks more like the aesthetic
and the prudential. It might indeed make little difference whether the claim that some
factor is prudentially or aesthetically relevant is itself a prudential or aesthetic claim. But
the normative  seems more like the causal  in this  respect.  That  something is  causally
relevant to an effect is a causal claim. That something is normatively relevant is, in the
parallel way, a normative claim. By ascribing some or other kind of normative difference
making, it constitutes an answer to the question what to do. For example, the claim that F
enables R to be a reason to φ constitutes a partial such answer. It implies that there is a
reason to  φ when F holds. If the fact that a factor makes a certain kind of normative
difference  weren’t  itself  a  normative  fact  but  only  a  normatively  significant  fact,  it
wouldn’t constitute such an answer (however indeterminate). Whether we accept (M3)
matters at least in this respect.
With my basic recipe on the table, I turn to three issues in metanormative theory: the
modal  status  of  basic  normative  principles,  normative  indeterminacy,  and  the
determination of reference for normative terms. In each case I’ll show that at least some
theories  about  each  issue  conform to  the  recipe  and  thus  have  first-order  normative
implications.
3. The Modal Status of Normative Principles
What kind of necessity  do normative principles  have? Consider basic moral  principles.
Many think that, whichever these are, they hold by metaphysical necessity. But some think
they  hold  as  a  matter  of  a  weaker  type  of  normative  necessity  (Fine  2002;  Rosen
forthcoming). Such principles are “fact-independent”, in that they hold and would’ve held
no matter what the world would’ve been like in wholly non-normative respects (Rosen
forthcoming). If P1 is the basic moral principle (or the set of basic principles) holding in our
world, then P1 would’ve been true no matter what we had thought, no matter how hard we
had tried to falsify P1, no matter what the laws of nature had been, and so on. But no moral
truths are metaphysically or otherwise absolutely necessary. In some worlds, some other
fact-independent basic principle P2 holds. I’ll argue that this view about the modal status of
moral principles conforms to my recipe. 
Views on the modal status of basic moral principles are metanormative. They concern a
certain feature of basic principles and require no stand on which principles are basic. But the
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metaphysical contingency of such principles would make first-order normative differences.
Some things that are right in our (and many other) worlds aren’t so in some other worlds
even if those worlds are identical in all non-normative respects. If P2 doesn’t hold in our
world, acts that satisfy it won’t always be right in our world. But if basic moral principles
are metaphysically contingent, then acts satisfying P2 will always be right in some other
worlds, no matter how the non-normative facts had been. So P2 is the basic principle of
morality in some “counter-moral” worlds, just as some “counter-nomic” worlds that don’t
conform to the actual laws of nature exhibit some other laws. The metaphysical contingency
of basic moral principles doesn’t mean that just anything could (metaphysically) have been
good or right (Bader 2017). It might be necessary that the basic normative principle is either
P1 or P2 and nothing else,  even if  each of P1 and P2 holds where it  does with mere
metaphysical  contingency.  But  it  does  mean  that  what’s  good  or  right  might
(metaphysically) not have been so. 
The metaphysical contingency of basic moral principles is a witness to (M1) in my recipe.
Let scenarios S and S* be identical in their qualitative non-normative properties, P1 the
basic moral principle in S, and S* the result of removing P1 from S. Whether or not some
other  principle  P2 must  be  substituted  for  P1 in  S*,  the  subtraction  of  P1 means that
normative  properties  are  distributed  differently  in  S  and  S*.  So,  given  this  test,  the
metaphysical  contingency  of  P1  makes  a  normative  difference.  (That’s  so  even  if  the
metaphysical contingency of P1 isn’t what explains the different normative facts in S and
S*.)  The rest  of  my  recipe  then  entails  that  the  claim that  basic  moral  principles  are
metaphysically contingent commits us to certain first-order normative claims.11 That’s so
even if  the normative  differences  to  which their  metaphysical  contingency commits  us
aren’t immediately recognizable as normative claims.
To  illustrate  this  more  concretely,  suppose  deontology  is  true  in  our  world  but  act-
utilitarianism  is  true  in  some  other  worlds.  (Constraints  such  as  consistency  and
universalisability don’t rule this out.) Act-utilitarianism might (metaphysically) have been
true in our world. Knowing all this, I can ask: Why shouldn’t we adopt act-utilitarianism
instead? After all, we could accept and act on alternative moral principles which hold in
counter-moral  worlds.  (The  counter-nomic  case  is  different:  we  cannot  but  obey  the
11 One note of potential caution here is that which normative claims we regard as metaphysically 
contingent (or not) can make a difference to how to draw the distinction between the normative and the
non-normative. For some examples of this (though rather different from mine), see Woods and 
Maguire (2017). 
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physical laws of our world.) And it’s possible to do so on the basis of sincere and competent
moral reasoning. Mistaken as they are, utilitarianism is what strikes my utilitarian friends as
morally authoritative by their best lights. For better or worse, the metaphysical contingency
view will reply that we should do what’s right in the actual world, not what would be right
if we were in a world where some alternative principle is true. 
The point I want to make is that the metaphysical contingency of the basic moral principle
isn’t  normatively  irrelevant.  If  it  were,  then  by (M2)  this  modal  fact  would  make  no
normative difference. But it does make one. Different facts about what’s right (with no
difference in non-normative facts) hold depending on whether any such given metaphysical
contingency obtains. That difference had also better be authoritative in the way normative
truths are. If someone says that our best theory of what basic moral principles hold in our
world is deontology, my utilitarian friends will offer reasons why utilitarianism is a morally
better  principle.  They had better  be  wrong.  For  if  utilitarianism were a  morally  better
principle,  how could deontology be the true morality in our world?12 The general point
holds irrespective of which principle holds in a given world with metaphysical contingency.
(If  there  are  reasons  to  think  that  deontology  is  a  better  morality,  it  seems  false  that
utilitarianism is the best theory of the basic principle in the putative counter-moral world.)
The basic principle had better be a principle which, given the alternatives, isn’t subject to
improvement and so merits our allegiance and compliance.
Given all this, (M3) is also plausible in this case. The view that basic moral principles are
metaphysically contingent is committed to some first-order normative claims. One example
would be the claim that the basic moral principle in our world is metaphysically contingent
but not such that some alternative principle better merits our allegiance and compliance.
Another  example  might  be  the  claim  that  those  non-normative  facts  which  would  be
normatively  significant  under  the  alternative  moral  principles  in  fact  are  normatively
irrelevant, and thus not what make right acts right.13 To be sure, these normative claims
don’t  constitute  any very  determinate  answers  to  the  question what  to  do.  But  not  all
normative  claims  do so anyway.  Note  that  if  the  view that  basic  moral  principles  are
metaphysically  contingent  does carry first-order normative  implications,  this  doesn’t  by
itself make the view less credible. Nothing in that claim shows that the basic principles that
justifiably  make  a  claim  on  our  allegiance  couldn’t  be  different  in  different  (non-
12 For a more extensive discussion of this kind of point, see Sayre-McCord (MS). 
13 It’s more controversial whether this is a normative claim.
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normatively identical) worlds. Perhaps the normative differences made by the metaphysical
contingency of those principles do have a sound, normatively non-arbitrary basis.14 But
first-order implications with a sound basis are still first-order implications. 
4. Normative Indeterminacy
My two other applications of my general recipe concern metanormative claims that make a
difference not to how normative properties are distributed but to the extensions of normative
predicates.  In  this  section  I  apply  the recipe  to  the claim that  the  extensions  of  many
normative predicates are  vague or  indeterminate. Is it morally permissible to abort a 24-
week-old fetus? Is it morally permissible to save a friend at the expense of four strangers'
lives? Cases like these might constitute borderline cases of moral permissibility. (Compare:
Patrick  Stewart  clearly  is  bald,  Ian  McKellen  clearly  isn’t,  and  in  between  there  are
borderline  cases.)  For  illustrative  purposes,  we  can  think  of  vagueness  as  involving
“semantic indecision”. There are multiple precise extensions that are candidate referents for
a  word,  but  our  linguistic  conventions  don’t  enforce  a  choice  of  any  one  of  these
sharpenings as the official referent (Lewis 1986, p. 213). So if ‘morally permissible’ is
vague, there might well be properties P1 and P2 such that (i) they fit ordinary facts about the
use of ‘morally permissible’ equally well but (ii) destroying a fetus at 24 weeks of gestation
determinately  has  P1  and  lacks  P2.  In  that  case,  our  linguistic  conventions  leave  the
extension of ‘morally permissible’ indeterminate between P1 and P2.
The  claim  that  the  extensions  of  normative  predicates  are  indeterminate  is  a
metanormative claim about the semantics of normative terms. One view in this debate is
that in fact there’s no indeterminacy despite semantic indecision. Further factors besides
how a word is used in a linguistic community can play a role in determining its reference.
For instance, “reference magnetism” is the idea that certain entities are intrinsically more
eligible  to  be  meant.  They  serve  as  “magnets”  for  expressions  to  refer  to.15 If  some
properties are “elite” in this way, a word can get a precise extension even if there are
multiple precise extensions which fit facts about use equally well. Views vary on what –
such as greater metaphysical fundamentality or objective naturalness – makes entities elite.
14 I assume throughout that normative truths, whether necessary or contingent, had better not be arbitrary.
15 For various versions of reference magnetism, see Hawthorne (2007), Sider (2011), Weatherson (2012),
and Williams (2018). The idea of reference magnetism is often attributed to David Lewis (1983, 1984),
but whether he endorsed it is controversial; see Weatherson (2012) and Schwartz (2014). The label 
“reference magnetism” was first used by Hodes (1984) for a related view. 
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Reference magnetism is a view in “metasemantics”. It’s invoked to explain in virtue of what
words and sentences have the semantic properties they do, where what semantics aims at is
a systematic characterisation of those semantic properties.16 
Regarding ‘morally permissible’, suppose that a candidate referent P1 has whatever it takes
to be more elite than P2, the only other contender.17 According to reference magnetism, it
follows  that  Destroying  a  fetus  at  24  weeks  of  gestation  is  morally  permissible is
determinately true if and only if destroying a fetus at 24 weeks has P1. Whatever the merits
of reference magnetism as a partial theory of how normative terms get their referents, this
looks like a morally substantive implication. That P1 is a reference magnet for ‘morally
permissible’ makes a difference to its extension. If P1 hadn’t been elite, then different clams
about what’s morally permissible, and thus different answers to the question what to do,
would have been true. 
The conclusion that this metanormative claim carries first-order normative implications can
be reached through a dilemma. Either being a reference magnet is a normative or a non-
normative property. (On most views, being fundamental and being objectively more natural
are non-normative properties.) If the claim that P1 is magnetic is normative, the claim Our
predicate ‘morally permissible’ refers to P1 because P1 is reference magnetic commits us
to a normative claim.18 If that claim is non-normative, then it at least presupposes that being
reference magnetic is normatively relevant. Differences in what falls and doesn’t fall under
‘morally permissible’ make a difference to what to do. That P1 is magnetic doesn’t itself
explain why its magnetism makes that kind of normative difference. What’s metaphysically
elite needn’t thereby be privileged in normative assessment (Eklund 2017, p. 30). But (M2)
implies that if the fact that P1 is a reference magnet for ‘morally permissible’ does make a
normative  difference,  it  must  be  normatively  relevant.  This  also  seems  independently
plausible. If it’s normatively arbitrary what properties are reference magnets, the truths that
follow from such a reference assignment are normatively arbitrary as well, and thus not
normatively relevant. But if the fact that P1 is a reference magnet for ‘morally permissible’
weren’t normatively relevant, why should we be concerned with whether our actions have
P1? What would give P1, and not P2, the claim to matter to the question what to do in this
16 See Schroeter and Schroeter (2017) for a useful survey of metasemantics in the context of metaethics.
17 Reference magnetism is applied to normative terms or concepts, in quite different ways, by van Roojen
(2006), Dunaway and McPherson (2016), Suikkanen (2017), and Williams (2018). 
18 The normative reference magnetism of Williams (2018) explicitly relies on certain substantive 
normative assumptions. 
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way?19 So  the  metanormative  claim  Our  predicate  ‘morally  permissible’  refers  to  P1
because P1 is reference magnetic has first-order implications. 
According to reference magnetism,  the extensions of vague normative predicates  aren’t
affected by slight differences in usage. But my general style of argument may extend also to
the view that the extensions of vague normative terms are “shifty”.20 On this view, ‘morally
permissible’ lacks precise application conditions because its extension is highly sensitive to
even slight differences in a linguistic community’s usage.21 The sentence of English x is
morally permissible may refer to P1 when uttered by S but to P2 when uttered by S* who’s
otherwise  just  like  S  but  belongs  to  a  linguistic  community  that  applies  ‘morally
permissible’ slightly differently from S. Thus different moral claims would be  true if we
used ‘morally permissible’ slightly differently. Such differences make a difference to the
extensions of normative predicates. Looking at data about language use should then be a
perfectly good method of moral deliberation insofar as it would be sufficient for us to learn
which moral claims are true and thus constitute correct answers to the question what to do.
Miriam Schoenfield points out that we’re inclined to resist this thought (Schoenfield 2016,
p. 266). My recipe promises to explain why. Non-normative facts about language use are fit
to be used in deliberation about what to do only if they are normatively relevant. Unless
they are normatively relevant, we have little assurance that when slight differences in use
make a difference to the extension of ‘morally permissible’, this will reliably tracks facts
about what’s morally permissible. But if we might easily fail to learn substantive normative
facts in learning facts about the extensions of normative terms, no wonder we’re inclined to
resist counting facts that might make a difference to their extensions as fit to be used in
deliberation about what to do. The shifty view of normative language might address these
worries  by denying that  factors  that  make a  difference  to  the  extensions  of  normative
predicates are normatively relevant. But this reply requires rejecting plausible assumptions
about the role their extensions can play in deliberation about what to do. 
19 I focus on questions about our normative terms, and bracket the question why we should be concerned 
with our ‘permissible’ and not an alternative term ‘permissible*’ that plays the same (or similar 
enough) practical role as ‘permissible’ but picks out some different property P2. Eklund (2017) is an 
extensive discussion of complications raised by such alternative normative terms. 
20 I lack the space to explore whether it extends also to some epistemic conceptions of normative vagueness. 
21 Here I’ll focus on differences that don’t affect the practical role of ‘permissible’. Differences in use 
which divest the term from its practical investment will generate differences in meaning. (Consider a 
community that uses ‘permissible’ to track their beer consumption.) But I don’t take those to be 
relevant to my purposes.
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My claims about these two views of normative vagueness run on a shared rationale. If some
factor that plays a role in determining the reference of ‘morally permissible’ is normatively
irrelevant, then facts about what falls into the extension of ‘morally permissible’ are to that
extent  normatively  irrelevant  as  well.  (They  might  be  normatively  irrelevant  by,  for
instance, making normatively arbitrary differences to extensions.) But that would be a bad
result. It would mean that truths about what’s morally permissible wouldn’t be fit to be used
in answering the question what to do. It’s much better to conclude that factors that make a
difference to the extensions of normative terms only do so if they’re normatively relevant,
even if taking them to be relevant doesn’t yield direct or highly determinate answers to the
question what to do. This rationale will resurface in my argument in section 6 below. But
first  I’ll  address  an important  objection  to  applying my recipe  to  claims  regarding the
metasemantics of normative terms. 
5. A Higher-Level Objection
My argument in section 4 requires that making a difference to the extension of a normative
term or concept is making a normative difference. This is what my recipe requires to deliver
the result that making a difference to the extension of a normative term or concept is a way
of being normatively relevant. But there’s a worry. Making a difference to the extension of
a normative term by making a difference to the determination of its reference (in my main
example, in the way that reference magnets do) isn’t making a normative difference. That
something makes this kind of difference to what falls under ‘wrong’ is a (metasemantic)
claim about  a  normative  term or  concept  that  picks  out  wrongness,  not  a claim about
wrongness. These are different subject matters. Outside the normative we recognize this.
We sharply distinguish claims about tigers and claims about ‘tiger’, for instance. Why not
do the same in the normative case?
A good way to bring about the objection is to consider what’s needed to secure the license
for the freedom of movement that ordinary practice tolerates between talk of what falls
under ‘right’ and talk of what’s right.22 The acceptability of  p and  ‘p’ is true go together
non-accidentally, for the meaning of the truth predicate gives us the T-schema that  ‘p’ is
true iff p. This equivalence of p and ‘p’ is true is contingent, since ‘p’ might have meant
something other than p. What’s needed to secure the license to move from the one to the
other  is  just  some or other  mechanism that  secures  their  actual  equivalence.  There’s  a
22 Thanks to Matti Eklund and Tristram McPherson for raising the kind of worries I try to address below.
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general  explanation  that’s  compatible  with  all  serious  theories  about  how  words  and
concepts get their referenc. Competent thinkers know that when they use ‘F’, ‘F’ predicates
F-ness, and so you correctly predicate ‘F’ of x only if x is F. Nothing can be right but not in
the extension of ‘right’ if we accept the T-schema.23 Noting this fact seems sufficient to
settle the question what to do in favor of φ-ing, if ‘right’ truly applies to φ-ing. (Add, if you
like, that semantic facts about what falls under ‘right’ will be evidence of what’s right.) We
needn’t  suppose that  the normative  case is  any different  in order  to explain  why such
semantic facts can be significant inputs to deliberation about what to do.24 
The reply I’m inclined to favor is that when p is normative, our license to move between ‘p’
is true and p does rely on certain normative presuppositions, and the normative is a special
case because of the distinctive role of normative considerations in regulating deliberation
and action. I won’t be able to defend this claim fully here, but I’ll motivate it with the
following scenario. Suppose I learn that our best theory of what falls under ‘right’ in its
moral uses in English ties the uses of ‘right’ in moral contexts to standards which I suspect
to be flawed or defective in some relevant way.25 Delicate questions arise regarding just
how I  might  express  this  thought  with  my conceptual  or  linguistic  resources,  but  the
scenario seems intelligible.26 (It’s not automatic that English reliably tracks correct answers
to the question what to do.) In such a case I would resist moving from ‘x is right’ is true to x
is right, in that I would resist accepting (in accordance with the role that ‘right’ plays in its
normative uses) that  x  is the thing to do. I might resist on two different grounds. First, I
might resist because I abandon the claim that x is right is true. I would do so on normative
grounds, namely reasons to think that x isn’t right. (In that case I’d have to think that what
seemed our best semantic theory of what falls under ‘right’ in fact wasn’t our best theory.)
That doesn’t seem sufficient to show that using the T-schema to move from the claim that it
23 Complications relating to semantic paradoxes and other hard cases can be bracketed as orthogonal 
here. 
24 These assumptions about the deliberative role of normative terms may not hold across all views about 
the theoretical role of their extensions. For instance, different views about the relative normative 
importance of differently information-sensitive readings of ‘ought’ will recommend different views 
about the deliberative role of the extension of ‘ought’. 
25 The claim that the meaning of ‘right’ is a contingent fact about English allows this kind of scenario. But 
the scenario doesn’t require ‘right’ to have a different meaning at the level of sense. Normative terms are 
plausibly semantically context-sensitive, and it’s a highly salient possibility that in that case their 
extensions are underdetermined in the way the scenario requires. ‘Right’ can still well function as a term 
whose role is to settle questions about what to do, instead of being used to track some such descriptive 
facts as our beer consumption. 
26 For a discussion of such delicacies (albeit one that brackets context-sensitivity), see Eklund (2017). 
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isn’t the case that x is right to the claim that it isn’t the case that x is right is true itself relies
on normative presuppositions. But, second, I could instead grant that x is right is true – but
only relative to poor standards, ones inappropriate to settling what to do. (This is compatible
with thinking that given what ‘right’ should mean, or should refer to in this context, x isn’t
right.27) To get a feel for this possibility, suppose that ‘right’ refers to P1 because P1 is
magnetic, but magnetism is determined at a level of metaphysical fundamentality which
collapses some moral distinctions. In that case I could grant that x is right is true iff x has P1
but resist accepting that x is right, even though (by the T-schema) x is right. Accepting that
x is right would commit me to doing x, and thus settle the question what to do in favor of x.
But this isn’t something to accept, since x is right comes out as true by ranking highly on
standards (namely, P1) which I regard as inappropriate to settling what to do. The latter kind
of  reaction  suggests  that  the  standards  that  determine  what  falls  under  ‘right’  aren’t
supposed to be normatively irrelevant or arbitrary, given the distinctive role that normative
considerations play in settling the question what to do. If those standards were irrelevant to
settling what to do, then so would be the bearing of facts about what falls under ‘right’ to
answers concerning what to do. 
Given how I characterised normative claims in section 2, claims about what falls into the
extension of a normative term or concept are normative claims if they constitute answers
(however  indeterminate)  to  the  question  what  to  do.  My  reply  above  doesn’t  strictly
speaking require that claims about what falls into the extension of a normative term or
concept themselves constitute answers to the question what to do. The reply only requires
that for a metasemantic factor to make a difference to the extension of a normative term is a
way  of  being  normatively  relevant  and  that  the  claim  that  something  makes  such  a
difference to what falls under a normative term is a normative claim. But my reply would be
stronger if formal mode claims to the effect that something falls into the extension of a
given normative term or concept were normative claims, whatever else they might be. So
let’s consider this briefly. 
Normative claims in material  and formal modes display similarities in their relations to
normative reasons. We normally suppose there’s a reason to do x either if x is right or if x is
right is true. The latter fact doesn’t itself seem like a reason to do x. But many think that the
fact that x is right is also not a reason (or at least not a non-derivative reason) to do x. Or
consider that we might count as normative those claims involving normative terms which
27 See Plunkett and Sundell (2013) for a discussion of these two kinds of “metalinguistic negotiation”.
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cannot be asserted consistently with normative error theory.28 This test (no doubt fallible)
correctly implies that Stealing is wrong and Wrongness is instantiated are normative claims.
But it also counts ‘Stealing is wrong’ is true as a normative claim. For error theorists would
take that claim also to commit us to the existence of categorical reasons for action, and thus
as much in error as  Stealing is wrong. And we typically suppose we can settle both the
question what’s right and the question what falls under ‘right’ by considering reasons for
and against particular things’ being right. No doubt this supposition (just as the error theory
test above) trades on the equivalence between ‘p’ is true and p. But I suggested that in the
normative  case  the  freedom  of  movement  between  the  two  carries  also  normative
presuppositions  about  their  bearing  on  answering  the  question  what  to  do  and  isn’t
exhausted by general facts about competence with the truth predicate. That said, some of
these similarities may not hold across the board. For instance, even if a reason why x is right
generally works also as a reason why x is right is true, the fact that x is right cannot make x
right but might be thought to make it true that x is right. I’ve offered some reasons to think
that formal mode claims about the extensions of normative terms and concepts count as
normative claims, but clearly there’s more to say about whether and when they do so.
6. Reference-Determination for Normative Terms
Earlier  I  applied  my  general  recipe  to  certain  metasemantic  claims  concerning  the
determination of reference for normative predicates which can be found in discussions of
normative vagueness and indeterminacy. I’ll now argue that my recipe applies also to the
sort of causal theory of reference for normative terms that’s usually associated with Cornell
moral realism.29 According to the causal theory of reference for a given term, the term has
its reference determined by what its use is causally linked to in the appropriate way.30 When
such causal links are in place, our uses of the term are “causally regulated” by the property
that’s the referent. A causal metasemantics for the natural kind term ‘water’ explains why
‘water’ (as used by us) refers to H2O by saying that H2O is the substance which causally
regulates  our  uses  of  ‘water’  (say,  through  communicative  exchanges  that  generate
appropriate causal links to initial dubbings of certain samples of liquid as ‘water’).31 
According to causal theories of reference for normative predicates, normative predicates
28 Thanks to Alex Gregory (personal conversation) for this suggestion. 
29 See e.g. Boyd (1988) and Brink (2001).
30 The appropriate way doesn't require speakers to associate any identifying description with the term.
31 See especially Putnam (1975), extending the causal theory of proper names in Kripke (1980). 
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also have their reference determined by what their use is appropriately causally linked to.
Suppose there are two properties, P1 and P2, which fit the facts about our use of ‘right’
equally well. If P1 and P2 are properties such as maximising utility or meeting the test of
the Categorical Imperative, we stand in causal links to each. But suppose that the property
that in the relevant sense regulates our use of ‘right’ is P1. Then, according to the causal
theory, ‘right’ picks out P1. In that case x is right is true iff x has P1. The explanation of
why ‘right’ has this semantics would be in part that P1 is what causally regulates our use of
‘right’. This metanormative factor makes a difference to the extension of ‘right’. Had our
use  of  ‘right’  been  regulated  by  P2  instead,  different  things  would  have  fallen  under
‘right’.32  What  I’ve  suggested  this  to  mean  is  that  the  causal  theory  identifies  a
metanormative factor that makes a normative difference.
The conclusion that this metanormative claim carries first-order normative implications can
again be reached through a dilemma. Being a property that causally regulates our use of
‘right’ is either a normative or a non-normative property. If this property is normative, it’s
immediate  that  the  claim  ‘Right’  refers  to  P1  because  our  use  of  ‘right’  is  causally
regulated  by  P1 has  normative  implications.  If  it’s  a  non-normative  property,  this
metanormative claim implies that being such as to causally regulate our use of ‘right’ is
normatively relevant. Causally regulating our use of ‘right’ makes a difference to what falls
under ‘right’, and insofar as this is a normative difference, the fact that P1 regulates our use
of ‘right’ is normatively relevant. The difference is makes looks normative. Note that it
seems perfectly legitimate to ask why, given that our use of ‘right’ is causally regulated by
P1, we ought to be concerned with whether our actions have P1 rather than P2.33 If the fact
that P1 plays this causal role made no difference to how to answer the question what to do,
why should we be concerned about this? Since we normally do care about whether our
actions are right, that an action has P1 is relevant to answering the question what to do. But
in that case such a fact is normatively relevant, and I’ve suggested those are normative
claims. So, either way, the metanormative claim  'Right' refers to P1 because our use of
'right' is causally regulated by P1 carries first-order normative implications.34 
32 Again we must take care with the sense in which this means that ‘right’ would mean something 
different.
33 Similar points are made by Eklund (2012) and Plunkett and Sundell (2013). 
34 There’s an interesting question whether my recipe applies also to conceptual role theories, on which 
the reference of normative predicates such as ‘right’ is determined by what property best fits the 
conceptual role of ‘right’, which we may take to consist in its role in practical reasoning (Wedgwood 
2001; Chrisman 2015). I lack the space to discuss the complications raised by this case. But see Eklund
(2017, pp. 54-9).
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Some  might  conclude  from  the  above  argument  that  causal  theories  of  reference  for
normative terms should be rejected. Here’s an example to illustrate the objection:
(O1) Helping the sick falls into the extension of ‘right’. 
(O2) Our use of ‘right’ is causally regulated by property P1.
(O3) According to causal theories of reference, (O1) holds in virtue of (O2). 
(O4) (O2) as such is normatively irrelevant. 
(O5) If  X  is  normatively  irrelevant,  and  Y  obtains  in  virtue  of  X,  then  Y  is
normatively irrelevant.35
(C) So, if causal theories of reference are correct, (O1) is normatively irrelevant.
Nothing in causal theories of reference as such yields reasons to help the sick. A causally
more  apt  regulator  of  our  uses  of  normative  terms  needn’t  be correspondingly  apt  for
normative assessment. This seems to make claims about what falls into the extensions of
our normative terms inapt to settling what to do, and thus normatively irrelevant. But if
helping the sick does fall into the extension of ‘right’, that’s not normatively irrelevant. (Or
so  I’ve  suggested.)  Causal  theories  of  reference  for  normative  terms  are  therefore
inadequate to their subject matter. 
This  objection  fails.  Causal  theories  can  take the reference  of  a  normative  term to be
constrained  epistemically,  by  whether  applications  of  the  term  enable  our  beliefs
increasingly  to  approximate  the  relevant  normative  truths  (at  least  provided our  initial
background  theories  are  relevantly  approximately  true).  Boyd,  for  instance,  holds  that
‘good’ refers to moral goodness only if moral goodness regulates the use of ‘good’ in moral
and non-moral reasoning so as to provide a basis for the growth of moral knowledge (Boyd
1988, p. 201).36 If our use of ‘good’ in reasoning doesn’t help us approximate truths about
moral  goodness,  our  use  is  causally  regulated  not  by  moral  goodness  but  some other
property. So ‘good’ couldn’t easily have referred to something other than what it actually
refers to.37 This also means that claims about what property causally regulates our use of
‘good’  make  normative  assumptions.  For  instance,  if  P1  is  that  property,  this  has
35 This is the “Principle of Irrelevancy Transmission” from Killoren (2016, p. 171).
36 As Boyd puts it, a term t refers to a kind (property, relation) k (in nondegenerate cases) just in case “the 
socially coordinated use of t provides significant epistemic access to k, and not to other kinds” (Boyd 
1988, p. 195). 
37 This point bears also on the Moral Twin Earth objection to naturalist realism. See Väyrynen (2018).
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implications for what moral goodness consists in. If our assumptions about what moral
goodness consists in are false, this will infect our assumptions about what property regulates
our use of ‘good’. The causal theory of reference for normative terms can thus agree that it
carries  first-order  normative  implications  but  claim that  it  needn’t  be less credible  just
because it  does so.  This  matters.  Many discussions seem to miss the point  that  causal
theories can agree that the question of which property relevantly causally regulates our use
of a normative term cannot be answered without raising the normative question of what the
normative facts are. 
7. Conclusion
I’ve argued that certain metanormative claims carry commitments to first-order normative
claims. The novelty of my argument doesn’t lie in this claim as such, but in the general
recipe I offer for generating instances of such dependence and in the specific instances of
the recipe which I defend. The cases I offer comprise certain views in debates on the modal
status of normative principles and the metasemantics of normative terms. These views make
differences  which,  while  they may not be immediately  recognizable as normative,  I’ve
argued to count as normative implications all the same. Carrying those implications needn’t,
however, make the metanormative views that carry them thereby less credible. I’ll have to
leave it an open question where else in metanormative theory my general recipe applies. 
If my arguments are on the right track,  this has ramifications for doing normative and
metanormative theory. On the one hand, particular normative theories will rule out certain
metanormative views, namely those whose normative implications are incompatible with
the first-order theories in question. On the other hand, certain metanormative views will rule
out certain first-order normative views, by implying certain others. Insofar as each sort of
theories  deploy the method of wide reflective equilibrium, in either  case we’ll  need to
consider whether to adjust the normative theories or the metanormative theories in question,
and on what grounds. Either way, neither normative nor metanormative theorists can decide
in advance to restrict their attention solely to their proprietary questions. Sometimes this will
be safe, but sometimes it won’t. The relevant safety checks can hopefully be informed by
the general recipe I’ve offered for determining whether a metanormative view has first-
order normative implications. 
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